The fears of so-called encirclement of Pakistan by Afghan-Indo-US alliance might force the ISI into reviving its old cold-war approach that had traditionally relied on a proxy war through "strategic assets". If that happens, the entire region would sink in further turmoil, not to speak of peace in Afghanistan and FATA. One would assume the US and other Western think tanks do realize this and go for an approach that is coordinated with the Pakistani government and is based on trust and not accompanied by stinking leaks on Pakistan as a whole.

Preceding and following  statements by major players involved in the Afghanistan-based questionable war against terrorism -  President George W.Bush, Admiral Michael Mullen, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, British prime minister Gordon Brown as well as the Afghan President Hamid Karzai , close to a dozen rocket attacks into the Waziristan region clearly portend the gathering of an ominous storm over Pakistan's northwestern border regions. Accompanying these developments was the "leak" to the New York Times which said that "analysts at the C.I.A. and other American spy and security agencies believe not only that the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, in July by militants was aided by ISI operatives, but also that the highest levels of Pakistan's security apparatus — including the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani — had knowledge of the plot."
Quoting a senior American official, the Times said  "it's very difficult to imagine he (Kayani) was not aware."

This almost direct accusation followed only hours after Gen Kayani, apparently upset by the spike in drone-fired missiles from across the border, made clear that the rules of engagement did not allow foreign troops to conduct operations against the militants inside Pakistani territory. It  is solely the responsibility of the respective armed forces, Kayani said in the statement.
The ISPR also quoted Kayani as saying that during  his meeting with the United States Army's senior officials, including Michael Mullen, aboard USS Abraham Lincoln on August 27, he "had urged the Americans that in such situations "military action alone cannot solve the problem."
As if to snub Gen.Kayani and the corps commanders' conference, the US military lobbed more missiles into North Waziristan Friday, killing another dozen or so people. This one targeted a madrassa of Jalaluddin Haqqani, while another one the following day aimed at Al-Badar mujahideen hideout.

Will such strikes improve coordination and cooperation between Pakistan armed forces and those based across the Durand Line? Will these strikes and the human toll they are taking force Kayani and his commanders to exercise "the right to defend our territory"? And how will this friction, if it arises, impact the current smooth relationship between the General Headquarters and the Civilian government practically under the wings of President Asif Ali Zardari?
All these questions obviously are agitating countless minds across Pakistan, as residents of the Pukhtoonkhwa in particular grow restless because of the stand-off between the military and the militants on the one hand, and the mounting number of missile assaults on alleged Al Qaeda shelters.

While the Bush administration is bent upon showcasing these strikes as "successes against havens of terrorists" to bolster Senator McCain's chances in the November presidential race, Pakistan army and the civilian government must weigh the possible fallout of the strident American attitude, which is likely to multiply civilian casualties as well as the all-time high anti-Americanism. (One must point out that, according to a recent survey by the International  Republican Institute,   the approval rating of the performance of American Embassy in Pakistan stood at a paltry 4.9 per cent and the IRI had to withhold this response from publication).
As pointed out by many, unilateral actions would only confirm the belief that the US is deliberately destabilizing a democratic government and acting to the detriment of an army which is already stretched and tracking down militants in Bajaur and Swat despite heavy odds.
Violating the Pakistani ground and air space (over 40 times in the year so far) , disregarding public opinion, and overruling socio-political  constraints  the army in particular faces in the tribal areas at the moment is likely to precipitate the situation further. An absence of realization by the American administration of such a precipitation will only add to the negative perception of the US policy agenda for the region. The recent mutual bickering, thus, probably warrants a detailed review and clarification of the rules of engagement on ground to avoid further acrimony. 
Although Presidents Karzai and Zardari exchanged vows of cooperation during their first encounter in Islamabad on September 9, yet the mutual mistrust is not likely to wane. Mr. Karzai has so far thrived off Pakistan-bashing because it gives him and his administration the raison d'etr i.e. the justification to cry foul of Pakistan by  harping on the American strings.

Physical incursion, even if selective,  will also provide the militants with a justification to engage coalition forces on a broader scale and expand their activities on both sides of the border as well as outside FATA. The war inside Afghanistan bears testimony to these fears; anti-American sentiments remain high, predominantly because of the sentiment arising out of indiscriminate search and hit operations being conducted by the US troops across Afghanistan.
Civilian casualties there tripled last year as thinly spread U.S. and NATO forces resorted to ever more on air power against insurgents, killing  200 through the first eight months of this year, compared with 321 in 2007 and 116 in 2006.
The U.S. Air Forces Central Combined Air and Space Operations Center has conceded  that the number of strikes this year in which munitions were dropped totaled 2,368 as of August 4.  The statistics for Afghanistan do not distinguish between strikes on behalf of NATO and those part of separate U.S. operations.

Growing unrest over civilian deaths also compelled and prompted President Hamid Karzai to speak out (September 4 ) soon after a deadly raid on a village by American and Afghan commandos which killed more than 90 civilians, including dozens of children. US officials kept denying the numbers and insisted the casualties were far less.
"In the last five years I have tried day and night to prevent these incidents from happening," Karzai told the villagers assembled inside a mosque in Shindand, several miles away from Azizabad where the deaths occurred off the US strike. He promised them that those responsible for the raid would face justice and be punished, the statement said. He already has fired two Afghan officers involved in the raid.

A frequent replay of such strikes inside the Pakistani territory is likely to stir public commotion on the one hand and trigger further resentment even within the ranks of the security apparatus, which finds itself in a very delicate situation; the hunt and destruction of Taliban and their hideouts also results in civilian casualties and displacements. The case in point is Swat and Bajaur.
Such a situation would most likely also stoke Pashtoon nationalism, providing its advocates with yet another opportunity to cry out for Pashtoons' rights and thus "seek to develop a bridge between 25 million Pashtoons living in Pakistani territory and 12 million Pashtoons on its side of the border,", as ex ambassador Peter Thomson put in a recent presentation.

Already obsessed with the growing Indo-Afghan ties, the Pakistani establishment is therefore loath to further erosion of its geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan. The fears of so-called encirclement of Pakistan by Afghan-Indo-US alliance might force the ISI into reviving its old cold-war approach that had traditionally relied on a proxy war through "strategic assets". If that happens, the entire region would sink in further turmoil, not to speak of peace in Afghanistan and FATA. One would assume the US and other Western think tanks do realize this and go for an approach that is coordinated with the Pakistani government and is based on trust and not accompanied by stinking leaks on Pakistan as a whole.